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1. Introduction
Since the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act, the regulators for auditing financial statements
have focused on the policies and effects of it on financial statements audits1. Investors are
interested in whether the newly introduced regulations (including public regulation and
voluntary regulation) were successful in increasing the effectiveness of the audit. However,
Francis (2004) states that policy making is inherently a political rather than scientific
process and accounting regulation lacks a tradition of using scientific based research as
input to policy deliberations. This trend exists in Japan as well, and many regulations have
been applied since the SOX Act, but the introduction of these regulations is realized by
critical public opinion due to serious fraud cases rather than based on scientific grounds.
Political policy decisions that are not scientific may create excessive costs for management,
auditors, investors, etc. that do not match the benefits. Audit researchers and regulatory
Research on Program Evaluation
for Financial Statement Auditing Regulations in Japan
Chiaki KAWABATA*
Abstract
In recent years, program evaluation has become an important topic in the
social science. In this research, to improve program evaluation for financial
statement audits, we reviewed previous research and investigated the current
system. As a result, we conclude that researchers need to better control
variables and improve access to data in program evaluation. As a result of
examination, this study proposes to conduct field experiments through
randomized-controlled trials and establish a data center to manage audit
quality indicators.
Keywords: financial statements audit, program evaluation, cost-benefit analysis,
AQIs, field experiment
* Ph.D. Student, School of Business Administration, Kwansei Gakuin University
1 Specifically, there are provisions prohibiting the simultaneous delivery of consulting services to
strengthen the independence of auditors. There are also provisions to introduce rotation rules for audit
offices, to introduce internal control audit reporting systems, and so on. In Japan, there is a partner
rotation system that came into effect in 2003; a provision prohibiting auditors from pursuing non-audit
work within a large company came into effect in 2004, and the Japanese version of the SOX act took
effect in 2008.
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bodies must measure the outcomes of programs and evaluate the effects in order to verify
regulations posteriorly (or in advance as a pilot test). Such activities conducted by regulators
and researchers are commonly called “program evaluation”2 and are often used in the fields
of pedagogy, epidemiology, and development science. Program evaluation is defined as “The
use of social research methods to systematically investigate the effectiveness of social
intervention programs in ways that are adapted to their political and organizational
environments and are designed to inform social action in ways that improve social
conditions”(Rossi et al., 2003).
In the program evaluation for Japan, the effect of regulation has been verified by
researchers who are in independent positions rather than regulators. However, researchers in
independent positions had limitations in terms of access to data and control of variables.
The purpose of this paper is to make recommendations for improving the effectiveness of
program evaluation for financial statement auditing regulations by reviewing previous
research and institutions. This paper considers (1) how regulators should evaluate policies on
audits of financial statements, and (2) how regulators can improve the availability of proxy
variables for policy evaluation. In this study we propose to conduct field experiments
through randomized-controlled trials (RCTs) and establish a data center to manage audit
quality indicators (AQIs) to improve variable control and data access.
2. Review of program evaluation for financial statement audit regulation
2.1 Theory on causal inference
One of the major concerns of program evaluation is to evaluate the effectiveness of
interventions using causal inference. There are three approaches to causality inference:
Campbell’s causal model (CCM), Rubin’s causal model (RCM) and Pearl’s causal model
(PCM). CCM is based on psychology; RCM is based on Fisher’s approach (Fisher, 1935)
and is frequently used in the fields of statistics and econometrics. PCM is based on Wright’s
approach (Wright 1921) and has a major impact on the fields of cognitive science, artificial
intelligence and machine learning. Gow et al. (2016) focuses on PCM in the accounting
field and encourages accounting researchers to use causal diagrams when conducting
empirical research. In this paper, we focus on RCM and CCM in order to estimate the effect
of these programs in financial statement audits.
RCM presents a conceptualization of compact and accurate causal inference by
determining whether or not regulatory intervention should be performed by random
assignment. RCT is a research design applied program setting that randomly assigns
2 The program evaluation targeted by this paper aims to estimate the effect of policy using causal
inference rather than for the purpose of describing the current conditions.
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Table 1. program effect
outcome measure
intervention group control group
program effectbefore
program
after
program
difference before
program
after
program
difference
variables Y1iB Y1iA E[Yi｜Ii = 1]
= E[Y1iB − Y1iA]
Y0iB Y0iA E[Yi｜Ii = 0]
= E[Y0iB − Y0iA]
E[Y1i − Y0i]
samples and compares the measured outcomes of the results to determine the effect of the
intervention. Here, if an observed difference between the intervention group (Ii = 1) and the
control group (Ii = 0) is written as E[Yi｜Ii = 1] − E[Yi｜Ii = 0], it can be taken as (1) the sum
of the average treatment effect and the selection bias. We rewrite (1) as (2).
E[Yi｜Ii = 1] − E[Yi｜Ii = 0] = E[Y1i｜Ii = 1] − E[Y0i｜Ii = 1] + E[Y0i｜Ii = 1] − E[Y0i｜Ii = 0] (1)
= E[Y1i − Y0i｜Ii = 1] + E[Y0i｜Ii = 1] − E[Y0i｜Ii = 0] (2)
Here, when the control group and the intervention group are randomly assigned, since
E[Y0i｜Ii = 1] = E[Y0i｜Ii = 0], (2) can be rewritten as (3). Therefore, observable differences
can be considered program effects (E[Y1i − Y0i]).
E[Yi｜Ii = 1] − E[Yi｜Ii = 0] = E[Y1i − Y0i｜Ii = 1] = E[Y1i − Y0i] (3)
Rossi et al. (2003) explained the program effect in the context of RCM as shown in
Table 1. E[Yi｜Ii = 1](= E[Y1iB − Y1iA]) and E[Yi｜Ii = 0](= E[Y0iB − Y0iA]) are the outcomes of
the intervention group and the control group, respectively. Y1iB and Y0iB are proxy variables
before program implementation of the intervention group and the control group. E and F are
proxy variables after program implementation of the intervention group and the control
group.
As described above, CCM defines a program effect by eliminating selection bias using
random assignment, while CCM aims at a more comprehensive approach. CCM has two
concepts, a categorization of validity and a threat to validity. Campbell’s validity classification
has four validities as follows, showing 37 threats to each (Shadish et al., 2002; Shadish and
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Sullivan, 2012).
● Statistical conclusion validity; The validity of inference about the correlation (covariation)
between treatment and outcome.
● Internal validity; The validity of inferences about whether observed covariation
between treatment and outcome reflects a causal relationship from treatment to
outcome, as those variables were manipulated or measured.
● Construct validity; The validity with which inferences are made from the operations
in a study to the theoretical constructs of those operations and to the theoretical
constructs those operations are intended to represent.
● External validity; The validity of inferences about whether the observed cause-effect
relationship holds over variation in persons, settings, treatment variables, and
measurement variables.
As described above, the CCM is an approach aimed at improving research programs that
use causality inference by clarifying the validity to be satisfied when performing causality
inference. Under CCM, RCM can be considered a useful tool for securing internal validity.
In the next subsection, we investigate efforts to improve internal validity and subsection 3
investigates efforts to improve the validity of constitution concept. It is important to note
that the purpose of these subsections is not to point out the problems of prior research but
to make suggestions to improve the research environment by clarifying the institutional
limits of empirical research.
2.2 Internal validity of financial statements audit research
In this subsection, we focus on the internal control reporting system and point out its
problems. The reason for choosing the internal control reporting system is that it is a
representative system reform in Japan after the SOX Act and there have been relatively
many empirical studies accumulated. Particularly in Japan’s research review, audit
researchers in independent positions selected research conducted using Japanese data on the
internal control reporting system.
Coates and Srinivasan (2014) reviewed papers that analyzed the impact of the internal
control reporting system based on the SOX act, and compared costs including indirect costs
and benefits (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Costs and benefits analysis
The net investor’s profits
First, there is a way to evaluate the net investor’s profits by using the reaction of the
stock market. Because consideration of cost / benefit to an investor’s internal control
reporting system is reflected in the stock price and transaction volume, by using the result,
it is easy to understand the cost / benefit. Many studies are trying to evaluate programs
using this method (Zhang, 2007; Jain and Rezaee, 2006; Li, Pincus, and Rego, 2008;
Akhigbe and Martin, 2006).
Unfortunately, Coates and Srinivasan (2014) state that these studies have proven to be
less beneficial in terms of SOX policy evaluation because they produce widely different
results, an important uncertain subjective remains. Therefore, it is difficult to evaluate net
effect, so it is necessary to verify benefits and costs.
In Japanese research, Takada et al. (2010) used a questionnaire to survey audited
companies and audit firms about the system introduction process and investigated whether
each component of the internal control was strengthened by introducing the internal control
reporting system. Both the audited companies and the audit firms responded that internal
control was strengthened. In addition, the paper analyzes the correlation between preliminary
preparation information on the internal control reporting system and shareholders’ capital
cost by using data from 2007 to 2008 before the introduction of the internal control
reporting system in Japan. As a result of the analysis, there is no significant correlation
between the two, suggesting that preparations in advance have no influence on investor’s
capital cost.
The benefits
Benefits include improving the quality of financial reporting, audits and internal control.
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First, there is improvement in internal control. Companies that were defective in internal
controls are small and needy and have CFOs with certain characteristics (low knowledge of
accounting, weak independence of the audit committee, weak internal control monitoring
techniques, and clawback provision clauses Not yet signed) had been hired. However, the
explanatory power of the model on internal control defects is low and there are many
problems (Defond and Zhang, 2014). In the Japanese research, Yazawa (2010) analyzed the
correlation between the determinant factors affecting the reporting of important deficiencies
and the disclaimer of opinion, relevance to the quality of profits, and valuation of securities
markets in the internal control reporting system. Reporting of important deficiencies were
correlated with profit generation, but securities markets were not responding. Fujiwara
(2017) also conducted analysis using propensity score matching for items that led to the
disclosure of deficiencies in internal controls. Explanatory variables (shareholding ratio,
having a relative of the representative director as the director, proportion of outside directors
on the board of directors, large board of corporate auditors, presence of legal experts,
ownership ratio of overseas investors, and increasing ration of holdings with individual
investors increasing) led to the disclosure of active internal control deficiencies. In addition,
as the scale of the internal audit system became larger, internal control problems were
prevented in advance. These results give suggestions for further improving the internal
control reporting system.
Second, there is improvement in the quality of accounting (financial reporting). Many
papers provide evidence consistent with the observation that the quality of accounting for
US companies has improved in the period since 2002. Cohen et al. (2008) found that
accrual-based profit management steadily increased from 1987 to 2002 and then declined
significantly. In Japan’s research, Niimi (2010) carried out a simple before-after study with
accrual around the introduction of the internal control reporting system. As a result, there
was no statistically significant difference before and after the introduction of the internal
control reporting system. When analyzing the determinant factor of the accrual principle,
fluctuation of the determinant factor is observed across the introduction, and this paper
shows that the behavior of the sample company shifts from discretionary profit manipulation
to substantive profit manipulation before and after the introduction.
Third, there is improvement in audit quality. There are few studies using more direct
audit quality measurements. DeFond and Lennox (2011) concluded that small audit firms
stopped auditing public companies after the SOX Act and that the SOX Act improved audit
quality allowing a low-quality auditors to quit. In addition, Dyck et al. (2010) have
discovered that after the SOX Act auditors have significantly improved in the role of
detecting and reporting fraud in public companies.
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The costs
The cost of the internal control reporting system is twofold: direct cost and indirect cost.
Direct costs include increased costs for verifying internal controls, expenses for reporting
and increased audit fees. Such costs are obviously increasing as a result of the SOX Act, but
there is no basis for estimating the auditor’s certification cost based on Section 404 (b).
Next, there are indirect costs related to the internal control reporting system. For example,
when resources on the management side are used for internal control and a chilling effect
on management, it is difficult to understand these mechanisms. Iliev (2010), a representative
cost-benefit analysis, uses quasi-experiments to separate the effects attributable only to the
SOX Act. The paper concludes that on the net, compliance with the SOX Act has reduced
the market value of small companies.
Based on the above reviews, empirical studies on the effects of institutions in both Japan
and the United States tend to conduct simple before/after analysis, correlation analysis, and
quasi-experiments. However, Gow et al. (2016) point out problems with quasi-experiments.
In order to estimate the program effect in a quasi-experiment, it is necessary to understand
that application of regulation “as if randomly,” and in many cases such situations do not
apply. Therefore, RCT can eliminate many threats to internal validities and statistical
conclusions validities. CCM argues that the effect of confounding factors can be isolated by
random assignment to the intervention group and the control group (Shadish et al., 2002).
2.3 Construct validity of financial statements audit research
The term “audit quality” is frequently used in discussions among stakeholders, in policy
decisions, and in research. Although various research defines audit quality, the International
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) (2014) concludes that audit quality is a
complex subject and there is no definition or analysis of it that has achieved universal
recognition. Therefore, the approach to developing a framework for understanding and
integrating research on audit quality is the “balanced scorecard” and IAASB (2014) is also
applied. IAASB (2014) identifies audit quality by breaking it down to eleven pieces from
the axis of the analysis unit (audit contract, audit firm, and nation) and the axis of the work
flow (input, process, and output) of the audit (See Table 2). Defond and Zhang (2014) analyzes
variables used as audit quality measurements, and many of these variables have advantages
and disadvantages. They points out the necessity of using variables properly according to
research objectives. Variables introduced in this paper are also used in empirical analysis on
Japanese audit quality. However, in the framework of IAASB (2014) the proportion of audit
quality currently observable in the US and Japan is small (see Table 3 - Class A).
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) (2015) enumerated 28
“audit quality indicators (AQIs)” candidates (see Table 2). PCAOB (2015) clarified potential
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users of AQIs and assumed that PCAOB (and other regulators) will use it in informing
policy-making, and assisting root cause, and quality control projects. Specifically, as Table 3
shows, it is evident that the number of proxy variables for audit engagement level items that
can be measured, mainly in the category of input process, is increasing. Therefore, the
publication of AQIs may improve the construct validity of program evaluation. However, the
comment letter of the report argues that there is a possibility of causing inappropriate
competition such as a reduction of audit fees at the expense of audit quality, and publication
of AQIs may cause unexpected adverse effects.
Table 2. PCAOB’s candidate AQIs
A
U
D
IT
P
R
O
F
E
SS
IO
N
A
L
S
Availability [1] Staffing Leverage
[2] Partner Workload
[3] Manager and Staff Workload
[4] Technical Accounting and Auditing Resources
[5] Persons with Specialized Skill and Knowledge
Competence [6] Experience of Audit Personnel
[7] Industry Expertise of Audit Personnel
[8] Turnover of Audit Personnel
[9] Amount of Audit Work Centralized at Service Centers
[10] Training Hours per Audit Professional
Focus [11] Audit Hours and Risk Areas
[12] Allocation of Audit Hours to Phases of the Audit
A
U
D
IT
P
R
O
C
E
SS
Tone at the Top and Leadership [13] Results of Independent Survey of Firm Personnel
Incentives [14] Quality Ratings and Compensation
[15] Audit Fees, Effort, and Client Risk
Independence [16] Compliance with Independence Requirements
Infrastructure [17] Investment in Infrastructure Supporting Quality Auditing
Monitoring and Remediation [18] Audit Firms’ Internal Quality Review Results
[19] PCAOB Inspection Results
[20] Technical Competency Testing
A
U
D
IT
R
E
SU
L
T
S
Financial Statements [21] Frequency and Impact of Financial Statement Restatements
for Errors
[22] Fraud and other Financial Reporting Misconduct
[23] Inferring Audit Quality from Measures of Financial Reporting
Quality
Internal Control [24] Timely Reporting of Internal Control Weaknesses
Going Concern [25] Timely Reporting of Going Concern Issues
Communications between Auditors
and Audit Committee
[26] Results of Independent Surveys of Audit Committee
Members
Enforcement and Litigation [27] Trends in PCAOB and SEC Enforcement Proceedings
[28] Trends in Private Litigation
Source: PCAOB (2015)
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Table 3. PCAOB’s candidate AQIs in audit quality framework
Engagement Level Firm Level National Level
Input
Values, Ethics,
and Attitudes
(C) The engagement team recognizes that the audit is
performed in the wider public interest.
(C) The engagement team exhibits objectivity and integrity.
(B) The engagement team is independent (PCAOB [16]).
(B) The engagement team exhibits professional competence
and due care (PCAOB [1], [2], [3], [5]).
(B) The engagement team exhibits professional skepticism
(PCAOB [1], [2], [3]).
(B) Governance arrangements are in place that establish
independence and the appropriate “tone at the top”
(PCAOB [13], [16])
(B) The firm promotes the personal characteristics
essential to audit quality (PCAOB [13]).
(B) Financial considerations do not drive actions and
decisions that may have a negative effect on audit
quality (PCAOB [15]).
(B) The firm emphasizes the importance of providing
partners and staff access to high-quality technical support
(PCAOB [5], [17]).
(B) The firm promotes a culture of consultation on
difficult issues (PCAOB [13]).
(B) Robust systems exist for making client acceptance
and continuance decisions (PCAOB [15]).
(A) Ethics requirements are promulgated
that make clear both the underlying
ethics principles and the specific
requirements that apply.
(C) Regulators and professional accountancy
organizations are active in ensuring that
the ethics principles are understood, and
the requirements are consistently applied.
(C) Information relevant to client acceptance
decisions is shared between audit firms.
Knowledge,
Experience,
and Time
(B) Partners and staff have the necessary competences
(PCAOB [5], [6], [7], [10]).
(B) Partners and staff understand the entity’s business
(PCAOB [11]).
(B) Partners and staff make reasonable judgments
(PCAOB [9], [11], [12]).
(B) The audit engagement partner is actively involved
in risk assessment, planning, supervising, and reviewing
the work performed (PCAOB [12]).
(B) Staff performing detailed “on-site” audit work have
sufficient experience, their work is appropriately
directed, supervised and reviewed, and there is a
reasonable degree of staff continuity (PCAOB [1],
[8]).
(B) Partners and staff have sufficient time to undertake
the audit in an effective manner (PCAOB [12]).
(B) The audit engagement partner and other experienced
members of the audit team are accessible to management
and those charged with governance.
(B) Partners and staff have sufficient time to deal with
difficult issues as they arise (PCAOB [5], [11] and
[12]).
(B) Engagement teams are properly structured (PCAOB
[1], [2], [5], [6]).
(C) Partners and more senior staff provide less
experienced staff with timely appraisals and appropriate
coaching or “on-the-job” training.
(B) Sufficient training is given to audit partners and
staff on audit, accounting and, where appropriate,
specialized industry issues (PCAOB [10]).
(A) Robust arrangements exist for licensing
audit firms/individual auditors.
(A) Education requirements are clearly
defined, and training is adequately
resourced.
(A) Arrangements exist for briefing auditors
on current issues and for providing
training to them in new accounting,
auditing or regulatory requirements.
(A) The auditing profession is well-positioned
to attract and retain high-quality individuals.
Process
(B) The engagement team complies with auditing standards, relevant
laws and regulations, and the audit firm’s quality control procedures
(PCAOB [18], [19]).
(B) The engagement team makes appropriate use of information technology
(PCAOB [17]).
(C) There is effective interaction with others involved in the audit
including, where applicable, internal auditors.
(B) There are appropriate arrangements with management so as to achieve
audit efficiency properly structured (PCAOB [18], [19]).
(C) There is appropriate audit documentation.
(B) The audit methodology is adapted to developments
in professional standards and to findings from internal
quality control reviews and external inspections
(PCAOB [18], [19]).
(B) The audit methodology encourages individual team
members to apply professional skepticism and exercise
appropriate professional judgment (PCAOB [13], [14]).
(C) The methodology requires effective supervision and
review of audit work.
(C) The methodology requires appropriate audit documentation.
(B) Rigorous quality control procedures are established,
audit quality is monitored, and appropriate consequential
action is taken (PCAOB [19]).
(B) Where required, effective engagement quality control
reviews are undertaken (PCAOB [19]).
(A) Auditing standards are promulgated
that make clear the underlying objectives
as well as the specific requirements that
apply.
(A) Bodies responsible for external audit
inspections consider relevant attributes
of audit quality, both within audit firms
and on individual audit engagements.
(A) Effective systems exist for investigating
allegations of audit failure and taking
disciplinary action when appropriate.
Output
<From the Auditors>
(A) Auditor’s reports to users of audited financial statements (PCAOB
[24], [25]).
(A) Auditor’s reports to those charged with governance
(C) Auditor’s reports to management
(C) Auditor’s reports to financial and prudential regulators
<From the Entity>
(A) The audited financial statements (PCAOB [21], [22], [23]).
(A) Reports from those charged with governance, including audit committees.
<From Audit Regulators>
(A) Providing information on individual audits (PCAOB [19], [27], [28])
<From the Audit Firm>
(A) Transparency reports
(A) Annual reports
<From Audit Regulators>
(A) Providing an aggregate view on the results of audit
firm inspections (PCAOB [19], [27]).
* (A) is the audit quality as revealed by public information. (B) is the audit quality that may become public information when AQIs of PCAOB are introduced. (C) is audit quality
of private information.
* For the notation of PCAOB [], see Table 2.
Source: The Author, based on IAASB (2014)
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CAQ (2016) considers whether the disclosure of engagement level AQIs information
should be mandatorily and expresses concern that mandated disclosure of engagement level
AQIs will lead to unintended consequences in the market. CAQ (2016) believe that
mandated public disclosure of engagement-level AQIs could lead to unintended consequences
and that any disclosures of engagement-level AQI information should be voluntary. For
example, AQIs could lead to a check-the-box compliance exercise or, worse, a misallocation
of resources and overemphasis on managing select metrics to the detriment of a focus on
other factors that might be more pertinent to quality performance. Therefore, for policy
evaluation, AQIs at the engagement level should not be fully disclosed, and it is necessary
to limit the scope of their publication.
3. Recommendations for program evaluation of financial statements audit regulation
3.1 Implementation of field experiments
In the previous section, I reviewed the study of program evaluation for audit regulation
of financial statements focused on the internal control reporting system in Japan. In this
section, as a recommendation to further improve the internal validity of program evaluation,
we will focus on field experiments by RCT.
In the field of environmental audits, Duflo et al. (2013) analyze how regulations on
companies conducting audits on pollution in India affect audits. In the paper, a field audit of
an environmental audit of an industrial plant was conducted for two years, and as a result,
conflicts of interest harmed the information provision, indicating that there is a possibility of
invalidating the regulation. In the paper, it is shown that environmental audits of industrial
plants are conducted for two years, and as a result, conflicts of interest may harm the
information supplement function and disable the regulation. As an example of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) performing field experiments in the field of finance, there
is a pilot test on deregulation of short selling in 2004. In conducting the pilot test, the SEC
had newly established the law called Rule 202T. It is an administrative rule stipulated for
the procedures of field experiments., so it can be seen that administrative rules are
sometimes required for program evaluation. In response to the requirements of the SEC,
each regulatory agency has agreed to publish transaction data so that researchers can analyze
the pilot program. Publishing data to researchers by regulators is an important process for
field experiments.
Floyd and List (2016) believe that the momentum of field experiments in the audit of
financial statements within the United States is rising. The PCAOB Economic Analysis
Center sets out an explicit goal of informing PCAOB activities using economic theory and
analysis (PCAOB, 2015). As illustrated at the PCAOB / Journal of Accounting Research
conference, the Economic Analysis Center shows interest in dialogue and exchange with
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accounting and financial scholars. As this relationship deepens, Floyd and List (2016) are
considering the opportunity for PCAOB to cooperate with scholars to implement policy-
related field experiments and the paper recommends that researchers conduct field
experiments. Therefore, this paper proposes the implementation of field experiments for
more effective control of variables.
3.2 Installation of AQI data center
In the previous section, we reviewed the construct validity in program evaluation for
regulation of financial statement audits. However, since independent researchers may limit
access to AQIs at the audit engagement level, it is difficult to use AQIs at the audit
engagement level as policy outcomes. In this section, I would like to consider a framework
to raise both the accessibility of AQI data at the audit engagement level and the
confidentiality of data by examining a sample case where data release has progressed by an
administration to assist independent researchers.
In recent years, efforts to improve the availability of data have received great attention in
administrations around the world. The US government has released “Data.gov,” a site that
provides various data sets related to statistical data possessed by the administration since
20093. President Obama issued “Executive Order - Making Open and Machine Readable the
New Default for Government Information” in 2013, and also announced a new policy on
open data. This presidential decree mandates government agencies make newly created data
as discoverable and accessible as possible, and made available for easy reuse while
considering the protection of personal privacy, confidential information, and information on
national security. The “Commission on Evidence-Based Policymaking” established under the
Obama administration submitted its final report (CEP, 2017). The Committee proposes an
attempt to secure data confidentiality as well as accessibility. The report is aimed at the
federal government to (1) develop a safe data access infrastructure, (2) secure a mechanism
to improve the privacy protection and transparency about data use for evidence building, and
(3) provide institutional capacity to reinforce evidence-building.
Efforts are also being made in Japan to increase the availability of data. For example,
“Electronic Administration Open Data Strategy” formulated by the Strategic Headquarters
for Promotion of Advanced Information and Telecommunications Network Society (IT
Comprehensive Strategy Headquarters) in 2012 is cited. Based on the same strategy, the
“road map for promotion of electronic administrative open data” was formulated, and based
on the same road map, in 2013 the data catalog site “DATA.GO.JP” was published by the
3 As of October 31, 2017, 197,980 data sets have been released and 129 data sets on Finance. The site
can be accessed from the following URL, https://www.data.gov/
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Figure 2. Method of data disclosure
Cabinet Secretariat4.
I propose the establishment of a data center on AQIs to improve data access for
independent researchers. Confidentiality of audit contract information can be secured while
permitting access to researchers by establishing a data center that manages AQIs related to
intervention of financial statement audits and other relevant AQIs.
Figure 2 shows the outline of the data publishing method. The regulator provides data on
intervention companies and control companies, the auditor provides Non-disclosed AQIs
through the data center, and provides Disclosed AQIs without passing through the data
center. The data center anonymizes only Non-disclosed AQIs. By anonymizing the
accessible data of registrants, regulators can reduce the risk of spillage. The data center
publishes Non-disclosed AQIs only to registrants who have signed a usage restriction
contract. By limiting the scope of publication to registrants, it prevents information leakage.
Registrants can access all data; non-registrants can access the data from intervention
companies and control companies and Disclosed AQIs. By establishing such a data center,
confidentiality can be secured while improving accessibility.
4 As of October 31, 2017, this data catalog site has 388 data sets registered and 103 country datasets
registered. Two datasets registered by the Financial Services Agency (EDINET and Registered Money
Investor Information Retrieval Service) are registered. The site can be accessed from the following
URL, http://www.data.go.jp/
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4. Conclusion
In this paper, we make suggestions to improve the effectiveness of program evaluation
for financial statement audits by reviewing previous research and institutions. First, we
inducted the three approaches in causal inference (RCM, PCM and CCM) and introduced
the work of previous research to improve the internal validity and the construct validity of
program evaluation for financial statement audits. In addition, we proposed approaches to
improve the current efforts (implementation of field experiments and establishment of a data
center of AQIs).
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